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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j).
H.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

None.
III.

STATEMENT OF CASE

The following colloquy between the trial court and counsel for Appellant D&K
Management ("D&K") summarizes the true posture of this case:
THE COURT: There are no facts left unless you identify some for me, and
that is one of my questions for you.
COUNSEL FOR D&K: Okay.
THE COURT: No facts left that determine possession, are there? Only the
damages that result from forfeiture of staying in possession?
COUNSEL FOR D&K: I would agree with your Honor that, given the
Court's ruling, there are no facts left - no facts left that have to be decided.
There were no facts initially with this motion for summary judgment.
(Emphasis added.)
THE COURT: Uh-huh, (affirmative).
COUNSEL FOR D&K: But given this ruling, there are no facts that have
to be decidedfor possession. However there are a number of facts and
there are certainly issues that remain with regard to their damages.
(Emphasis added).
THE COURT: Oh, I agree with that.
(H'rg Tr., 4:24-5:11, May 26, 2004; R. 999; attached hereto as Exhibit A.)
This exchange took place following remand from this Court in IHC Health
Services, Inc. v. D&K Management, 2003 UT 5 ("D&KF). It demonstrates D&K's
concession to the trial court: there are no material disputed facts in this case. The
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exchange took place during a hearing on finality of judgment for Rule 54(b) certification.
The trial court had been pressing D&K to explain exactly what facts, if any, remained
undetermined. Unable to avoid the trial court's direct exploration of D&K's claims,
counsel was forced to concede that there really are no facts which are undisputed.
Accordingly, the trial court affirmed its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of
IHC Health Services ("IHC") on the issue of whether D&K forfeited its lease with IHC
(hereafter the "Lease"). (Order, Jan. 23. 2006; R. 1370-74.)
In this appeal, though, D&K abandons the candor with which it addressed the trial
court. It now insists that a trial was warranted, even though it conceded to the trial court
there were no disputed material facts. (Appellant's Br. at 20.) In sum, D&K's current
appeal is nothing more than an attempt to create issues and arguments where none existed
before the trial court.
This Court previously decided the controlling legal issues in this case in D&K I.
In D&K I, this Court agreed with the trial court and with D&K's more candid arguments
and found that "the material facts in this case appear to be undisputed." 2003 UT 5, ^ 9.
The Court went on to note that "there are disputes [such as, historically,] whether rent
was timely paid,. . . but these factual disputes are not material." Id. at n.2. This Court
determined that, in initially granting IHC summary judgment, the trial court
"misapprehended one material fact" and remanded to the trial court to review D&K's
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"waiver" defense "under the totality of the circumstances." Id. at <[| 9.l
Even though the instructions on remand were limited to review of the waiver
issue, and even though D&K limited its arguments to the trial court to the waiver issue on
remand, D&K now attempts to reverse the trial court's renewed ruling in favor of IHC
based on new legal theories that it never argued to the trial court. Chiefly, D&K claims
that it should now be entitled to a trial on the theory of "substantial compliance."
(Appellant's Br. at 20.) This theory was never mentioned to the trial court until the trial
court's second summary judgment ruling (after remand) was being certified for appeal.
(Id. at 9.) It was never briefed until after the Court of Appeals determined the case was
not yet ripe for appeal, in a motion to reconsider. (Id. at 11.) Oddly, D&K claims that it
preserved the defense of substantial compliance by pleading "unconscionability" in its
answer. (Id. at 23-24.) It argues that unconscionability and substantial compliance are
synonymous and therefore, because it "substantially complied" with the Lease, it would
be "unconscionable" to allow IHC to forfeit its leasehold. (Id.) This argument is odd for
the reason that it has already been disposed of by this Court. In D&K /, this Court
expressly held that "[permitting IHC to enforce the forfeiture provision of the written
lease agreement after D&K's failure to pay rent following a one-month acquiescence in
late payment is not unconscionable . . . " 2003 UT 5 at ^f 11.
In sum, having found that (1) there were no disputed facts regarding the waiver
issue that would preclude summary judgment, (and D&K having conceded as much to the
1

In addition to the waiver defense, D&K also raised an estoppel defense at the
trial court and on appeal in D&K I. This Court held that IHC could not be estopped from
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trial court), and (2) it is not unconscionable to allow IHC to enforce the forfeiture
provision based upon one month's missed rent, this Court has already disposed of all of
the arguments D&K now makes.
IV.

RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS

As in D&K I, Appellant's Statement of Facts is set forth in general prosaic form,
without numbered paragraphs, making direct challenges to the claims difficult. However,
this Court should note that the facts set forth by D&K in an attempt to demonstrate a
dispute are the same facts that this Court already found to be irrelevant in D&K I. Id. at
n.2. .:.'"
April Rent. The sole "new" fact that this Court asked the trial court to consider on
remand was the fact that IHC retained D&K's April 1998 rent check. Id. at % 9.
However, this fact is immaterial in light of the fact that IHC cashed D&K's April rent
check before it elected to terminate the Lease by issuing a Notice of Default.
Importantly, D&K paid the April rent on April 8, 1998. (Appellant's Br. at 5.) IHC sent
D&K a Notice of Default and Forfeiture of Lease Agreement on April 14, 1998 because,
at that time, March 1998 rent still had not been paid. {Id.) In other words, at the time
IHC issued a Notice of Default, D&K was undisputedly in default, and IHC had the right
to exercise any of its contractually-reserved options under the Lease. Indeed, D&K did
not even attempt to tender the March rent until April 16, 1998. (Id.) It is undisputed that
IHC never accepted the March rent. (Id.)

forfeiting D&K's leasehold as a matter of law. D&K I, 2003 UT 5, ^ 12.
SaltLake-310675.4 0033566-00014
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A.

Relevant Facts for This Court to Consider

Because IHC was awarded summary judgment, the only facts this Court need
consider are those the trial court found undisputed to see if they give rise to judgment as a
matter of law. Those facts are:
1.

In January 1998, IHC purchased a strip mall at 52nd South State Street,

Murray, Utah from Medical Plaza 9400. (Answer ^ 7; R. 39.)
2.

Before that purchase, D&K leased space in the mall (specifically, 5142

South State Street) from Medical Plaza 9400, under a written lease agreement dated July
18, 1994. (Answer T| 5; R. 39.)
3.

When IHC purchased the mall, it accepted an assignment of Medical Plaza

9400's interest in the Lease. (Answer f 7; R. 40.)
4.

With the assignment of the Lease, D&K became IHC's tenant. Pursuant to

section 3 of the Lease, D&K was obligated to pay IHC $3,280 per month in rent.
(Answer 1ft 7, 8; R. 39-40.)
5.

According to Section 3 of the Lease, this rent was due "in advance of the

first day of each calendar month . . . ." (Answer <|| 8; R. 40.)
6.

Section 17.1 of the Lease provides, in pertinent part:
Default by Tenant. Upon the occurrence of any of the
following events, Landlord shall have the remedies set forth
in Section 17.2:
[a]

Tenant fails to pay any other sum due hereunder within (10) days
after the same / shall be due.

(Answer 114;R.41.)
7.

Section 17.2, in turn, provides, in pertinent part:
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Remedies. Upon the occurrence of the events set forth in
Section 17.1, Landlord shall have the option to take any or all
of the following actions, without further notice or demand of
any kind to Tenant or any other person:
[c]

Termination of this lease by written notice to Tenant. In the event of
such termination, Tenant agrees to immediately surrender possession
of the Demised Premises.

(Compl. Ex. A; R. 18; Answer If 15; R. 41.)
8.

After IHC took ownership of the property leased to D&K, D&K paid rent

for February 1998. (Answer % 9; R. 40.)
9.

D&K did not make any rent payment for March 1998, during March 1998.

(Answer 110; R. 40.)
10.

On or about April 8, 1998, D&K delivered a rent check to IHC's corporate

headquarters for April rent (hereafter "April Rent"). This check was cashed by IHC
shortly thereafter. (Answer 111; R. 41.)
11.

On April 14, 1998, after IHC cashed the April Rent check, IHC gave D&K

written notice that it was exercising its option to terminate the Lease by sending D&K a
Notice of Default and Forfeiture of Lease Agreement (hereafter the "Termination
Notice").2 (Answer Tl 16; R. 42.)
The Termination Notice was written as though no April rent had been paid. (R.
29.) This was due to the fact that, at the time the Termination Notice was sent, IHC's
property managers did not know that D&K had paid April's rent. (See Aff. of Thomas
Uriona, Feb. 2, 2001, f 6; R. 278-79.) IHC property managers subsequently discovered
that D&K had delivered a check to IHC's corporate offices (rather than to the property
managers) and had designated the check as "April rent." (Id.) However, it is an
undisputed fact that as of April 14, 1998, D&K still had failed to pay March 1998 rent.
(Appellant's Br. at 5.) Additionally, when D&K ultimately tendered March 1998 rent on
April 16, 1998, that check, like all subsequent rental payments, was rejected. (Id.) Since
that time, IHC has placed all of D&K's tendered rents in escrow, according to an
SaltLake-310675 4 0033566-00014
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12.

On or about April 16, 1998, D&K attempted to tender its March 1998 rent.

(Aff. of Kent Bangerter, May 19, 2002,114; R. 120.) However, IHC rejected that
payment and returned the check to D&K. (Id. ^ 15.)
13.

On or about March 1, 1999, D&K and IHC entered into a Consent,

Reservation of Rights and Escrow Deposit Agreement ("Escrow Agreement") whereby
D&K could tender what it claimed to be additional accruing rents, and IHC could reject
such payments without waiving any of its rights under the Lease. (R. 157-162.) The
Escrow Agreement was designed to preserve the status quo of the landlord/tenant
relationship, without either party being accused of having waived their arguments in this
litigation.
14.

Paragraph 4 of the Escrow Agreement provides that:
[T]he parties agree that, by the execution and delivery of this Escrow
Agreement, IHCHS does not waive its claims of default and/or forfeiture of
the Lease Agreement against D&K Management by allowing D&K
Management to continue to occupy the Leased Premises or to make any one
or all of the Escrow Deposits, and all of IHCHS' claims and assertions
against D&K Management, including without limitation those set forth in
the Default Letter, and against any defenses of D&K Management, whether
articulated before or after the date of this Escrow Agreement, are expressly
reserved and not waived by reason of this Escrow Agreement and shall not
in any way be lessened or diminished by reason of or in connection with the
execution and delivery of this Escrow Agreement. (Emphasis added) (R.
157-58. Attached hereto as Exhibit B.)

agreement that IHC "does not waive its claim of default and/or forfeiture of the Lease
Agreement by allowing D&K Management to continue to occupy the Leased
Premises . . . ." (Answer If 20; R. 42-43.) In short, it is an undisputedfact that no rent
payments were accepted by IHC after it delivered the Termination Notice to D&K.
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15.

Since sending the Termination Notice, IHC has never accepted any

payment from D&K except pursuant to the Escrow Agreement. (Answer % 20; R. 43-43.)
IHC submits that these undisputed facts (hereafter "Facts") entitled it to judgment
against D&K as a matter of law for forfeiture of the Lease; IHC's post-Termination
Notice conduct cannot now be claimed a waiver of its rights to terminate D&K's
leasehold.
V.

RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
D&K raises four issues on this appeal. It claims that all four issues involve pure
questions of law which allow no deference to the trial court and which should be
reviewed for correctness. (Appellant's Br. at 1-3). This is only partially correct.
Issue 1. D&K's first issue involves an appeal from the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to IHC on the issue of forfeiture of the Lease. Although the decision
of whether to grant summary judgment is normally reviewed for correctness, trial courts
have broad discretion in determining whether a waiver has occurred. See Living
Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7, 10-11 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (reviewing trial court's
decision to reject defendant-tenant's waiver defense as a matter of law under an abuse of
discretion standard). Indeed, as this Court recognized in D&K I, "unlike most cases, the
legal conclusions underlying a trial court's grant of summary judgment on a waiver issue
are reviewed with some measure of deference." 2003 UT 5 at \ 6. Accordingly, on this
appeal, this Court should again determine whether the trial court's decision on the
application of the law of waiver to the facts of this case "falls within the bounds of [the
trial court's] discretion." Id.

SaltLake-310675.4 0033566-00014

8

Issue 2. D&K's second issue, whether the trial court erred by denying it a trial on
substantial compliance, was raised by D&K for the first time in a motion to reconsider.
Necessarily then, D&K must argue that the trial court improperly denied its motion to
reconsider. Indeed, D&K's own papers indicate it appeals from the trial court's order
denying its motion to reconsider. (Appellant's Br. at 2.)
Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is a matter on which
deference is given to the trial court, and such a ruling will be disturbed only for an abuse
of discretion. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996). Therefore, any
argument that D&K makes pertaining to the trial court's alleged error in failing to grant it
a trial on the issue of substantial compliance must be reviewed for an abuse of discretion,
not for correctness.
Issues 3 & 4. Whether to grant an award of attorney's fees is a legal conclusion;
however, the calculation of any particular award is "in the sound discretion of the trial
court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (internal cites
omitted). Further, determining which party was the "prevailing party" on a particular
motion or appeal for purposes of awarding attorney's fees "depends, to a large measure,
on the context of each case," and, therefore is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, If 25, 40 P.3d 1119. In other words, the
trial court's decision as to who was the "prevailing party" on each matter in this case is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this Court should review the trial
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court's decision as to the amount of attorney's fees that it awarded to IHC under an abuse
of discretion standard.
VI.

SUMMARY

In summary, the issues D&K has raised should be disposed of as follows:
Issue 1:

Did the trial court fail to view the facts in the light most favorable to

D&K and improperly draw inferences that were the province of the jury in granting IHC
summary judgment on the issue of waiver?
Answer:

No. There are no disputed facts in this case; therefore, a jury trial is

unwarranted. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to conclude that the
undisputed facts could not give rise to a clear expression of intent on the part of IHC to
waive its right to terminate the Lease. Because IHC's retention of the April Rent was not
an affirmative act undertaken by IHC after it declared that D&K forfeited the Lease, it
does not demonstrate a clear intent to waive forfeiture once forfeiture was declared.
Moreover, the trial court properly concluded that IHC's actions were necessary to protect
its interests after a stay was imposed pending the outcome of this litigation and were
undertaken pursuant to the Escrow Agreement by which D&K agreed that IHC's conduct
would not constitute a waiver.
Issue 2:

In refusing to allow D&K a jury trial on substantial compliance, did

the trial court err in:
a.

declaring forfeiture without a pleading of materiality of breach?
Answer:

No. D&K never moved to dismiss IHC's complaint on

this basis, so this argument has not been preserved for appeal. Nor do the notice pleading
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rules require IHC to specifically plead "materiality." It was sufficient for IHC to plead
that D&K breached the Lease. Moreover, D&K's failure to pay rent was a material
breach of the Lease.
b.

ruling that D&K had not raised substantial compliance in its
pleadings?
Answer:

No. D&K failed to plead "substantial compliance" in

its Answer. Nor did it seek leave to amend its Answer to assert this defense. D&K's
assertion of an "unconscionability" defense did not adequately place IHC on notice that
D&K intended to rely on a "substantial compliance" defense. To the extent that D&K
argues that "substantial compliance" is the same defense as "unconscionability," this
Court has already ruled that termination of the Lease is not unconscionable.
c.

ruling that the law of the case precluded consideration of substantial
compliance?
Answer:

No. The trial court properly refused to revisit its grant

of summary judgment in favor of IHC under the law of the case doctrine because no
"exceptional circumstances" were present sufficient to warrant reopening the decision on
the forfeiture matter. Exceptional circumstances were lacking due to the fact that D&K
itself was responsible for its own failure to argue substantial compliance during the
summary judgment phase of this litigation.
d.

failing to consider D&K's Motion for Reconsideration under the
standards applicable to Rule 54(b)?

SaltLake-310675.4 0033566-00014
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Answer:

No. Under Rule 56(e) D&K is wholly responsible for

its failure to raise substantial compliance during the summary judgment phase of this
litigation. D&K opted to rely solely on waiver and estoppel defenses when faced with
summary judgment on the issue of forfeiture. D&K must now face the consequences of
that decision. Rule 54(b) does not provide a basis for D&K to get a second chance to
relitigate its case after it lost on waiver and estoppel. Accordingly, the trial court
properly exercised its discretion in refusing to grant D&K's Motion to Reconsider,
e.

ruling that D&K had not presented facts that would support
substantial compliance?
Answer:

No. D&K's "facts" regarding substantial compliance

are the same facts that it relied upon for its estoppel defense. This Court ruled against
D&K on that defense. Therefore, D&K has not raised any new facts that would lead to a
different outcome under the theory of "substantial compliance."
Issue 3:

Did the trial court err in deciding that IHC was entitled to attorneys'

fees under a provision in the Lease that allowed recovery of fees for an action filed
"during the term" of the Lease?
Answer:

No. IHC is entitled to attorneys' fees because IHC brought this

action to enforce its rights under the Lease. The Lease explicitly provides IHC with a
right to attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing the Lease. Specifically, IHC brought this
action to enforce section 17.2[c] of the Lease, whereby D&K agreed to vacate the
premises upon receiving IHC's Termination Notice.
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Issue 4:

Did the trial court err in awarding fees on the basis of the record

below where:
a.

IHC failed to provide evidence upon which the trial court could
determine that IHC s were necessary and reasonable?
Answer:

No. IHC provided ample evidence in support of the

reasonableness of its fees. This is evidenced by the fact that it took D&K over a month
and a half to respond to IHC's Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees. Moreover, over 300 pages
of the trial court record are devoted solely to the reasonableness of IHC's fees.
b.

IHC failed to apportion its fees to matters on which it was successful
and the court effectively shifted to D&K the burden of apportioning
IHC's fees between successful and unsuccessful matters?
Answer:

No. The trial court did require IHC to resubmit a

second Affidavit of Fees removing fees for matters on which IHC did not prevail. The
trial court properly exercised its discretion in apportioning and determining the
reasonableness of the fees.
c.

the court awarded IHC fees for matters on which it was not
successful, contrary to applicable precedent?
Answer:

No. The trial court had broad discretion in

determining whether IHC "prevailed" on any given matter. The trial court further
instructed IHC to remove fees on certain matters for which IHC was not the prevailing
party. What is more, the trial court disallowed IHC to recover over $40,000 of fees for
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matters for which the trial court did not find IHC to be the prevailing party. In sum,
D&K has not demonstrated that the trial court committed patent error in allocating fees,
d.

the court failed to make findings of fact necessary to permit
appellate review of the reasonableness, necessity and apportionment
of issues?
Answer:

No. The trial court satisfied its obligation to make

explicit findings under each Bracken factor and under the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Further, appellate review of the reasonableness of the fees is limited to an abuse of
discretion. Accordingly, the trial court's findings demonstrate that the trial court clearly
did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees.
VI.
1.

ARGUMENT

The Trial Court Properly Granted IHC Summary Judgment as a Matter of
Law, Despite D&K's Waiver Claim.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. D&KI, 2003 UT 5, <([

11; Soter's, Inc. v. DeseretFed. Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993). Waiver
requires three elements: (1) an existing right; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an
intention to relinquish the right. Id. at 940. "Intent to relinquish a right must be distinct"
in order for waiver to occur. Id. A trial court is granted "very broad discretion" in
determining whether a waiver has occurred in a particular case. Living Scriptures, Inc. v.
Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938-39
(Utah 1994)). Accordingly, the trial court in this case had broad latitude in concluding
that IHC's conduct did not amount to waiver as a matter of law.
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A.

Waiver May Be Decided as a Matter of Law,

D&K correctly notes that intent, an essential element of waiver, is generally a
question of fact. Nevertheless, courts have not hesitated to rule as a matter of law on the
issue of waiver when the evidence is conclusive or the facts undisputed. E.g., American
Sav. & Loan Ass }n v. Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Utah 1968) (holding that waiver may
be determined as a matter of law if evidence of intent is conclusive); Davidsohn v. Doyle,
825 P.2d 1227, 1229-30 (Nev. 1992) (holding that summary judgment may be granted on
a waiver issue); NationsBank of Georgia v. Conifer Asset Mgmt, Ltd., 928 P.2d 760, 763
(Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that deciding waiver as a matter of law is warranted if
material facts are not in dispute); Jones v. Maestas, 696 P.2d 920, 922 (Idaho Ct. App.
1992) (deciding waiver as a matter of law). To be sure, in Olympus Hills, the court ruled
as a matter of law against the tenant-defendant on its waiver defense. Olympus Hills
Shopping Ctr.y Ltd v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 461 (Utah Ct. App.
1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).
If each waiver defense necessarily demanded a trial, as D&K's argument implies,
not only would Olympus Hills and the other above-mentioned authorities need to be
reversed, but this Court's ruling in D&K I would also need to be overturned. In D&K I,
this Court did not remand for a jury trial. Instead, it remanded "to the trial court for
reconsideration of its prior ruling in light of the correct facts regarding the April
payment." Id. at f 9 (emphasis added). Had this Court been persuaded by D&K's
arguments, which it merely repeats again on this appeal, this Court could have and simply
would have remanded for a trial. See J. Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud, 2007 UT App
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88, % 14 ("if the supreme court determined that a . . . trial was the only way to determine
[an issue], it would have so directed the trial court in its remand."). This Court correctly
gave deference to the trial court to decide whether a trial was necessary in light of the
April Rent. This ruling necessarily encompassed the understanding that the trial court
may well conclude that the one additional fact regarding the April Rent did not warrant a
trial. D&K's argument that the question of intent is always subject to a fact-finder's
inquiry contradicts D&KI, Olympus Hills, and all other cases deciding waiver on
summary judgment.
B.

Summary Judgment Was Warranted Because There Are No Disputed
Material Facts.

Summary judgment should be granted when there is "no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, an appellate
court need only decide "whether the trial court erred in applying the law and whether a
material fact was in dispute." E.g., Ford v. Amer. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT
70,19,98P.3dl5.
It is the law of the case, from a ruling of this Court, that there are no disputed facts
that would necessarily preclude a ruling on summary judgment on the issue of waiver in
this case. In D&KI, this Court held that the material facts in this case regarding waiver
are undisputed, specifically noting that any factual disputes were "irrelevant" or
"immaterial." D&KI, 2003 UT 5,19, n.2. Indeed, after receiving this Court's opinion,
D&K conceded to the trial court that there were no disputed facts regarding any legal
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issues surrounding IHC's right to obtain possession of the property. During a May 26,
2004 hearing before the trial court, following remand from this Court, the following
colloquy took place:
THE COURT: No facts left that determine possession, are there? Only the
damages that result from forfeiture of staying in possession?
COUNSEL FOR D&K: I would agree with your Honor that, given the
Court's ruling, there are no facts left - no facts left that have to be decided.
There were no facts initially with this motion for summary judgment
(Emphasis added.)
THE COURT: Uh-huh, (affirmative).
COUNSEL FOR D&K: But given this ruling, there are no facts that have
to be decidedfor possession. However there are a number of facts and
there are certainly issues that remain with regard to their damages.
(Emphasis added).
(H'rg Tr., 4:24-5:11, May 26, 2004; R. 999. Ex. A.)3
Thus, not only has this Court previously ruled that there are no disputed material
facts to defeat summary judgment on the issue of waiver, but D&K itself conceded to the
trial court that there were no disputed facts on the issue of possession.4 Having instructed
the trial court that there were no material disputed facts, D&K cannot now complain to
this Court that the trial court accepted its own concession.

Significantly, IHC'S claims for damages were dismissed voluntarily, so no such
claims, and no such fact disputes, exist today.
4
It is significant that the trial court asked D&K if there were any fact disputes that
would preclude a legal ruling on "possession" rather than merely limiting its inquiry to
the waiver defense. D&K was specifically asked if there was any factual inquiry that
remained for any legal theory regarding IHC's right to take possession of its property.
D&K candidly instructed the court that there were not. Certainly, if it was going to raise
substantial compliance, or any of the alleged disputes D&K now claims exist, it was
under an obligation to do so when asked by the trial court.
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To be sure, the parties do not dispute that IHC sent D&K the Termination Notice
on April 14, 1999. (Fact 11.) Similarly, they do not dispute that, at the time of the
Termination Notice, D&K was in default because it had not paid rent for March 1998.
(Facts 9, 12.) The parties do not dispute that IHC never accepted or cashed any rent
check after April 1998, except under the Escrow Agreement, pursuant to which D&K
agreed that IHC did "not waive its claims of default and/or forfeiture of the Lease."
(Facts 14, 15.)
IHC does not dispute that it inadvertently cashed the April Rent check before
sending D&K the Termination Notice, and that the payment was never returned to D&K.
(Fact 10.) However, the single undisputed fact that IHC retained the April Rent payment
does not preclude summary judgment, as suggested by D&K. To the contrary, because
there is no dispute as to any material fact, a trial is unwarranted on the waiver issue. See,
e.g., Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., Inc., 2004 UT App 354, U 48, 101 P.3d 371
("Because [defendant] did not set forth facts sufficient to create a disputed issue of
material fact, . . . the trial court did not err by concluding that [plaintiff] was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.") Because the retention of the April Rent is undisputed,
there was no reason for a jury to consider the "totality of the circumstances" on remand
from D&K I. There are no facts for a jury to decipher.
Because each fact that D&K alleges supports a finding of waiver is undisputed, the
trial court was free to rule on the waiver issue as a matter of law. See Soter 's, 857 P.2d
at 940 (describing the issue of whether "intentional relinquishment was or was not
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shown" as a "legal question"). Consequently, the trial court did not err in refusing to
grant D&K a jury trial on the waiver defense.
C.

Viewing the Facts in the Light Most Favorable to D&K, a Waiver Did Not
Occur.

Even after this Court ruled that the trial court initially misapprehended one fact
regarding the April Rent, IHC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. One
additional fact—that IHC retained the April Rent after inadvertently cashing D&K's
check—does not alter the conclusion that IHC did not waive its right to terminate the
Lease.
In order to survive summary judgment on a waiver defense, a defendant must
show facts that could support an inference that the plaintiff "clearly intended" to waive a
known right. See Soter 's9 857 P.2d at 940 (stating that waiver should not "be found from
any particular set of facts unless it was clearly intended"). In rejecting the stilted, singlefact-specific waiver analysis proposed by D&K in D&K I, this Court clearly stated that,
to find a waiver, a fact-finder must determine whether the totality of the circumstances
supports an inference that waiver was "distinctly made." D&K I, 2003 UT 5 at ^f 4
(quoting Soter's, 857 P.2d at 942). D&K argues that IHC's retention of the April Rent,
"Dear Tenant" letters, receipt of rent checks under the Escrow Agreement, and demands
for insurance create a triable dispute as to whether an implied waiver occurred.
(Appellant's Br. at 18-20.) D&K is wrong.
First, regarding the April Rent, it is undisputed that D&K paid the April Rent
before IHC issued the Termination Notice and that IHC has never accepted any payments
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after it declared forfeiture (except under the Escrow Agreement). (Facts 11, 15.) Simply
put, the mere fact that IHC retained rent that it received before it declared forfeiture does
not suggest that IHC waived its right to declare the forfeiture. Indeed, IHC had no
obligation under the Lease to return any rent payments that it received before its
declaration of forfeiture. Therefore, by simply retaining the April Rent, IHC did not
affirmatively or "distinctly " engage in conduct from which a fact-finder could infer an
intent to relinquish any forfeiture rights under the Lease. Cf Soter's, 857 P.2d at 940
("mere silence is not a waiver unless there is a duty or obligation to speak.") (quoting
Plateau Mining Co. v. Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 730 (Utah 1990).
IHC's retention of D&K's April Rent was no more a "distinctly made" waiver than its
retention of D&K's February 1998 rent, because D&K paid both rents before IHC
declared forfeiture. Consequently, the April Rent is irrelevant to either the question of
default by D&K or waiver by IHC. In fact, the trial court's ruling found D&K in default
under the Lease based solely on the missed March 1998 rent payment. (Order, July 29,
2004, 3; R. 1100.)
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that IHC had received and retained the
April Rent after it declared forfeiture, a fact-fmder still could not infer an intent to waive
based on that fact alone. See, e.g., Living Scriptures, Inc., 890 P.2d at 10 (recognizing
that the mere acceptance of a rental payment from a tenant in breach, while enforcing
other rights under a lease, is not alone enough to constitute waiver of the right to
terminate a lease for default); Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd., 889 P.2d at 461 (same);
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see also Davidsohn, 825 P.2d at 1229-30. Regardless, that is not what occurred here, no
matter how favorably the facts are viewed to D&K.
The remainder of IHC's actions (the "Dear Tenant" letters, demands for proof of
insurance, etc.) do not give rise to an inference that IHC intended to affirm the Lease for
two main reasons. First, the trial court issued a stay in this matter, thereby allowing
D&K to remain in the premises owned by IHC pending the final outcome of this
litigation. (R. 685-89.) Because this stay effectively obligated IHC to act as D&K's
"landlord," IHC was required to undertake certain actions to protect itself, such as
requiring that the building be insured. Therefore, contrary to D&K's argument that
IHC's conduct should have been viewed most favorably to D&K so as to suggest that
IHC intended to affirm the Lease, IHC's conduct could only be viewed as consistent with
IHC's desire to preserve its right to terminate the Lease. At most, IHC's conduct
demonstrated only its reasonable efforts to protect its rights and interests while the
dispute over the forfeit of the Lease continued.
Second, the parties entered into an Escrow Agreement, which expressly states that
"IHCHS does not waive its claims of default and/or forfeiture of the Lease Agreement
against D&K" by allowing D&K to remain in possession of the property during this
litigation. (Fact 14 (emphasis added).) The trial court was required to consider the
Escrow Agreement under the "totality of the circumstances." See Living Scriptures, Inc.,
890 P.2d at 10 n.5 (holding that an anti-waiver provision is a factor to consider in
determining whether a waiver has occurred). Thus, D&K's argument that IHC engaged
in "dozens of acts . . . that recognized the Lease as in force" (Appellant's Br. at 20), is
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directly contrary to D&K's contractual agreement and should be disregarded by this
Court.
In sum, given the trial court's discretion to decide whether the "totality of
circumstances" could give rise to an inference that IHC "distinctly made" a waiver, the
trial court clearly did not err. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in applying
the law of waiver to the facts of this case, and its grant of summary judgment in favor of
IHC was not an abuse of discretion.
2.

D&K Cannot Belatedly Seek a Trial on Substantial Compliance.
C.

D&K Impermissibly Argues That IHC Failed to Plead Materiality of
Breach for the First Time on Appeal.

As an initial matter, D&K argues that IHC failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted because "IHC did not plead materiality" of the breach of the Lease.
(Appellant's Br. 22.) The Court cannot consider this untimely argument because D&K
has raised it for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v.
Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ^ 14, 48 P.3d 968 ("in order to preserve an issue for appeal, the
issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an
opportunity to rule on that issue.") As D&K itself notes, an issue is not preserved for
appeal unless: (1) it was timely raised; (2) it was specifically raised; and (3) a party
introduced supporting evidence and relevant legal authority to the trial court. Id.
(Appellant's Br. 28 (quoting Albores v. Bracamontes, 2006 UT App 204, ^ 4).)
Here, D&K never raised this argument to the trial court before or after D&K I.
Therefore, it is not surprising that D&K fails to point to a single instance where it argued
to the trial court that IHC's Complaint should be dismissed for failure to plead materiality
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of breach. To be sure, the argument that IHC failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted could only have been raised in a pleading or by motion to the trial court. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b), 12(h). Instead, D&K raises this argument on its second appeal to
this Court, a full eight years after it filed its Answer. Without a doubt, D&K's assertion
is untimely and cannot be considered by this Court.5 See also Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(5)(A) (stating that appellate briefs must contain a "citation to the record showing
that an issue was preserved in the trial court").
B.

v

D&K Waived Its Substantial Compliance Defense When It Failed to Plead
This Affirmative Defense in its Answer.

Despite the fact that the affirmative defense of "substantial compliance" was
nowhere mentioned by D&K until 2004, five years after it filed its original answer and
after summary judgment was already entered in favor of IHC twice, and after summary
judgment was reviewed by this Court once, D&K now asks this Court to accept that it
raised substantial compliance in its original answer. (Appellant's Br. at 23-24.) In fact,
D&K raised the defense of "substantial compliance" for the first time in a Motion to
Reconsider, following the renewed motion for summary judgment after D&KL {Id. at 9;
see also R. 1108.) D&K argues that it preserved the right to assert "substantial
5

Even if this Court were to consider the merits of D&K's argument, it should be
rejected outright. First, D&K's failure to pay rent is a material breach. See, e.g.,
McKeon v. Williams, 799 P.2d 198 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) ("failure to pay rent could be
nothing other than a material breach."). Second, D&K offers no authority for the
proposition that IHC must actually plead materiality of the breach in its complaint. {See
Appellant's Br. 22 (stating that the case law merely "suggests" that materiality is an
essential element of a forfeiture claim).) Moreover, D&K's argument is at odds with
Utah's notice pleading rules. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1) ("Each averment of a pleading
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compliance" by pleading the defense of "unconscionability" in its answer, because
substantial compliance "constitutes a major part of the defense of unconscionability."
(Appellant's Br. 23-24.). This matter may be summarily disposed of by the Court.
Under Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party seeking to avoid a
claim must, in plain and simple terms, plead any "matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c); see also Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken,
668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983). The primary purpose of requiring a defendant to plead
affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c) "is to ensure that parties have adequate notice of the
issues and facts in the case." Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ^ 30, 56
P.3d 524. A plaintiff must have advance notice of the defendant's affirmative defenses in
order to adequately assess whether and when to bring a motion for summary judgment.
Valley Bank & Trust Co., 668 P.2d at 494. Therefore, affirmative defenses that are not
pled in accordance with the rules of civil procedure are waived. Id.
Here, prior to D&K's Motion to Reconsider, neither IHC nor the trial court were
ever put on notice that D&K intended to rely on a substantial compliance defense. D&K
offers no explanation as to how IHC or the trial court should have surmised that its
defense of "unconscionability" encompassed a possible "substantial compliance"
argument.6

shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are
required.")
6
D&K attempts to fault IHC for never briefing "or even mentioning]" the
substantial compliance issue in its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Appellant's
Br. 28.) Yet, plaintiffs are never expected to anticipate defenses that a defendant such as
D&K omits from its answer. Rather, the burden is always on defendants to adequately
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D&K admits that substantial compliance is only a "part" of the broader doctrine of
unconscionability. (Appellant's Br. 24.) Yet, if the defensive of substantial compliance
is different from unconscionability, then that defense has clearly been waived. There is
no dispute that D&K did not plead or argue "substantial compliance" in its pleadings, in
the motion for summary judgment before Judge Livingston, in the first appeal to this
Court, in the renewed motion for summary judgment before Judge Hilder, or in the
briefing before the trial court and the Court of Appeals on certification. It raised it for the
first time in a Motion to Reconsider with Judge Hilder after each of those other rulings
had already been handed down.
On the other hand, if "substantial compliance" and "unconscionability" are the
same defense, as D&K suggests, then this matter has already been ruled on by this Court.
In D&K I, this Court expressly held that it would not be "unconscionable" to allow IHC
to forfeit D&K's Lease based upon a single month's missed rent. "Permitting IHC to
enforce the forfeiture provision of the written lease after D&K's failure to pay rent
following a one month acquiescence and late payment is not unconscionable." D&K I,
2003 UT 5,^11. Based upon the foregoing, this entire defense should be passed over by
this Court. Simply put, the matter has been ruled upon to the extent it has not been
waived.

apprise plaintiffs of their expected defenses. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c); see also Valley Bank &
Trust Co., 668 P.2d at 493-94 (holding that a defendant could not raise defenses in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment that were not raised in its answer or by
proper motion, because the plaintiff was entitled to proper notice of the defendant's
affirmative defenses before moving for summary judgment).
SaltLake-310675.4 0033566-00014

25

As this Court has recognized, if defendants such as D&K could omit defenses
from their answers and later raise them when faced with summary judgment, "summary
judgment could always be thwarted." Valley Bank & Trust Co., 668 P.2d at 494. It is
even more egregious to attempt to raise omitted defenses after summary judgment. If
D&K wanted to assert substantial compliance as grounds for defeating summary
judgment, it should have followed the rules of civil procedure and sought leave from the
trial court to amend its answer.7 See id. It should have then briefed the defense in an
attempt to defeat IHC's renewed motion for summary judgment, if not IHC's original
o

motion for judgment on the pleadings. D&K did not do so and thereby waived this
defense. Moreover, because D&K waived this defense by failing to include it in its
answer, D&K clearly cannot raise this defense now, on its second appeal. See id. ("Nor
can the appellant raise [an affirmative] defense on appeal when it was not properly
presented to the trial court.").
C.
Even if D&K Pled Substantial Compliance, it Waived This Defense By
Failing to Argue it on Summary Judgment.

7

Although D&K added a "substantial compliance" defense to its answer to IHC's
supplemental complaint in November 2004, the supplemental complaint did not change
any pleading regarding the forfeiture issue and never gave D&K grounds to add defenses.
Accordingly, D&K was required to seek leave from the trial court to add this defense
under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Because D&K never sought leave
to do so, this defense was not properly asserted in the November 2004 answer.
IHC's initial motion leading to judgment was for judgment on the pleadings. It
was only converted to summary judgment by D&K's introduction of affidavits. Faced
with the argument that nothing in the pleadings prevented judgment as a matter of law
certainly obligated D&K to reference "substantial compliance" if it believed the doctrine
would, as pleaded, prevent judgment.
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As D&K concedes, IHC argued that "[a]ll of D&K's affirmative defenses fail as a
matter of law" during the summary judgment phase of this litigation. (Appellant's Br. 7.)
Yet, D&K never rebutted IHC's argument by defending its supposed substantial
compliance defense to the trial court. (Id. at 28.) Perplexingly, D&K attempts to pin the
blame for this omission on IHC. (Id. at 7, "IHC did not attack or even mention the
defense of unconscionability [and therefore] D&K was under no obligation to brief that
defense or provide factual support for it.") The Court should reject D&K's attempt to
evade responsibility for its own unexcused omission.
It is a basic rule of civil procedure that every party to litigation has a duty to
"incorporate all relevant arguments in the papers that directly address a pending motion."
Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 122 (1st Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Moreover, a
defendant bears the burden of proof on its affirmative defenses. State Bank ofS. Utah v.
TroyHygro Sys., Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Accordingly, a
defendant waives any defenses that it fails to raise in response to a plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment, even if those defenses were properly pled in the defendant's answer.
H&G Ortho, Inc. v. Neodontics Int% Inc., 823 N.E.2d 718, 731 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005);
Diversey Lever, Inc. v. Ecolab, Inc., 191 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
More specifically, Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that,
when a party moves for summary judgment, the nonmovant "may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response . . . must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). In other words, the
party opposing a motion for summary judgment has an affirmative duty to respond to the
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motion with affidavits or other materials allowed by Rule 56(e). Waddoups v.
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69,ffif31, 36, 54 P.3d 1054; State Bank ofS Utah,
894 P.2d at 1277. Under Rule 56(e), a non-moving defendant must support any
affirmative defenses it intends to rely upon to defeat the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment. See Pantry, Inc. v. Stop-N-Go Foods, Inc., 796 F.Supp. 1164, 1167 (S.D. Ind.
1992) (holding that when a plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the issue of
liability, the nonmovant has a duty to support any applicable affirmative defenses, and
that simply pleading affirmative defenses in an answer does not preserve those defenses
which are not argued in opposition to the motion for summary judgment). After
summary judgment, a defense is no longer preserved simply because it was pled; under
Rule 56(e), the defense must be argued to the trial court. Id.; United States v. AMC
Entm't, Inc., 232 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1118-19 (CD. Cal. 2002).
Here, IHC moved for judgment on the pleadings as to whether D&K forfeited the
Lease.9 This triggered D&K's obligation to argue and support any and all affirmative
defenses that would have defeated IHC's forfeiture claim.10 D&K could have and should

9

IHC's Motion was converted into a motion for summary judgment. D&K I, 2003
UT5,n.l.
10
The fact that IHC specifically anticipated D&K's modification and waiver
defenses in its motion is completely irrelevant. IHC had no burden to preserve D&K's
substantial compliance defense by specifically rebutting it. Rather, D&K had a duty
under Rule 56(e) to set forth all of its arguments—including its substantial compliance
argument—which would have shown that there was a genuine issue for trial. D&K
claims that because "waiver was dispositive" it did not need to raise substantial
compliance to the trial court or in D&KL The disingenuity of this argument is revealed
by the fact that D&K found it necessary to argue estoppel below and in D&KL If waiver
truly was "dispositive" query why D&K found it necessary to not only bring and argue
estoppel but to also seek a redetermination of this Court that its estoppel argument failed.
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have raised the substantial compliance defense in its cross-motion for summary
judgment. Yet, D&K did not do so. (Appellant's Br. 8 ("D&K asserted only waiver and
an estoppel defense.").) Nor did D&K raise a substantial compliance defense on its
appeal to this Court in D&K I, or on remand to the trial court after D&KI. In fact, at a
March 2004 hearing to decide the forfeiture issue on remand, the trial court gave D&K's
counsel repeated opportunities to raise other defenses in addition to waiver. In response,
D&K continued to rely solely on its waiver argument.
THE COURT: . . . if this Court was to determine under the undisputed facts that
are now in the record, that a waiver has not occurred, is there some reason under
the law of summary judgment, this Court could not do that?
COUNSEL FOR D&K: Absolutely. . . waiver
(Hr'g Tr., 10:3-12, Mar. 2, 2004; R. 839. Attached hereto as Exhibit C.)
The very first time that D&K even mentioned substantial compliance was two
motions after Judge Hilder's question, during a May 2004 hearing on IHC's Motion for
Rule 54(b) Certification. (Appellant's Br. 9.) However, at that hearing, following
repeated interrogation by the trial court, D&K twice conceded that the forfeiture issue
was resolved and only damages remained to be determined:
COUNSEL FOR D&K: I would agree that, given this Court's ruling, there are no
facts left - no facts left that have to be decided. There were no facts initially with
this motion for summary judgment.
COUNSEL FOR D&K: But given this ruling, there are no facts that have to be
decidedfor possession.
(Hr'g Tr., 5:2-10, May 26, 2004; R. 999. Ex. A (emphasis added).)
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In sum, D&K clearly did not meet its burden under Rule 56(e) to set forth specific
facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial on substantial compliance. Thus,
D&K waived any substantial compliance defense.
D.

The Trial Court Was Well Within Its Discretion To Refuse To Consider
The Substantial Compliance Defense on D&K's Motion to Reconsider.

D&K concedes that it first briefed the doctrine of substantial compliance to the
trial court in its October 2005 Motion to Reconsider, a full year and a half after the trial
court expressly asked D&K if there was any defense that would preclude summary
judgment besides waiver,11 and a half decade after IHC moved for judgment on the
pleadings. (Appellant's Br. 11.) D&K argues that the trial court erred in refusing to
reconsider its grant of summary judgment in favor of IHC on the grounds that D&K
substantially complied with the Lease. For several reasons, D&K is wrong.
1.

The Trial Court Was Not Required to Consider Substantial
Compliance Because D&K Raised it For the First Time on a Motion
to Reconsider.

A trial court has discretion in declining to consider defenses that are argued for the
first time in a motion for reconsideration. Matosantos Comm. Corp. v. Applebee's Int 'I,
Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2001) ("A motion for reconsideration is not,
however, an opportunity for the losing party to raise new arguments that could have been
presented originally."); Ogunwo v. Amer. Nat'llnsur. Co., 936 P.2d 606, 611 (Colo. Ct.

11

D&K states that it first mentioned the issue of substantial compliance during the
May 2004 hearing on IHC's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification. (Appellant's Br. 9.)
However, D&K concedes that it did not fully address the defense at the hearing, and
instead argued that the defense was "yet to be decided." (Id.)
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App. 1997) ("a court need not entertain new theories on a motion to reconsider following
the grant of summary judgment").
D&K did not raise substantial compliance during the summary judgment phase of
the litigation, on appeal to this Court in D&K I, or on remand. This is especially
surprising in light of D&K's current contention that it has known about this argument
since it filed its original answer. (See Appellant's Br. 23 (arguing that D&K pled
substantial compliance "at the outset of this litigation").) Tellingly, D&K offers no
justification for its failure to argue this defense to the trial court, despite the fact that it
supposedly has been aware of the defense since the "outset" (other than the erroneous
argument that IHC had the burden to raise the defense on its behalf). Accordingly, the
trial court was under no obligation to consider D&K's argument and therefore did not
abuse its discretion in denying D&K's Motion to Reconsider. See Nance v. LJ. Dolloff
Assoc, Inc., 126 P.3d 1215, 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reconsider a defense that a party knew
about but failed to raise during the summary judgment phase of the litigation.)
Further, once a trial court declines to consider a new theory raised by a party on a
motion to reconsider, that party cannot pursue its theory on appeal, as D&K seeks to do
here. Cooper v. Dist. Court, 133 P.3d 692, 716 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). Accordingly,
this Court should: (1) affirm the trial court's discretion to refuse to reconsider D&K's
substantial compliance defense, and (2) refuse to consider that defense on this appeal.
2.

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That the Law of the Case Doctrine
Precluded it From Considering D&K's Substantial Compliance
Argument.
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In denying D&K's Motion to Reconsider, the trial court found that, in addition to
the fact that D&K waived its substantial compliance argument, D&K was precluded from
bringing the argument under the law of the case doctrine.12 (Order, Jan. 23, 2006, f 9; R.
1370-75.) Therefore, even if this Court were to conclude that D&K did not waive its
substantial compliance defense, the trial court's decision to deny D&K's Motion to
Reconsider under the law of the case doctrine should be affirmed.
Simply stated, the law of the case doctrine renders a decision made on an issue
during one stage of a case binding on successive stages of the same litigation. Thurston
v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). The law of the case doctrine
constrains a trial court's ability to reconsider its earlier rulings under Rule 54(b) of the
rules of civil procedure.13 Virgin Ail. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'I Mediation Bd., 952 F.2d
1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Even if Rule 54(b) allows parties to request district courts to
revisit earlier rulings, the moving party must do so within the strictures of the law of the

D&K misstates the trial court's rationale for declining its Motion to Reconsider.
D&K argues that the trial court relied "exclusively" on the Smith v. Osguthorpe decision,
2005 UT App 11. (App.'s Brief at 25.) In fact, the trial court simply relied on the law of
the case doctrine, "as described in Smith v. Osguthorpe." (Order, Jan. 23, 2006, ^f 9; R.
1372 (emphasis added).) D&K's critique of the Osguthorpe decision, therefore, is of
little avail to D&K, because the trial court correctly applied the law of the case doctrine,
rather than one particular decision, to the facts of this case.
13
Although D&K brought its Motion to Reconsider under Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court's denial of the Motion is more properly analyzed
under Rule 54(b) because a final judgment had not yet been rendered. See Trembly v.
Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that "the
substance, not the caption of a motion is dispositive" and analyzing a motion to
reconsider under Rule 54(b) rather than Rule 60(b) because a final judgment was not
rendered in the case). However, it is noteworthy that D&K did not properly bring its
Motion to Reconsider and that D&K's Motion "is not provided for under the Utah Rules
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case doctrine"); 10 Moore's Federal Practice § 54.25[4] (3d ed. 2006) ("If motions based
on the court's power under Rule 54(b) could compel the court to revisit those
adjudications, much of the advantage in making the early rulings would be lost. For this
reason, the law of the case doctrine provides some protection from routine reexamination
of interlocutory adjudications.").
D&K argues that the trial court was wrong to apply the law of the case doctrine
because that the law of the case doctrine only applies to "issues actually or necessarily
decided in a previous appeal," and the substantial compliance issue was never "decided in
a previous appeal." (Appellant's Br. 25.) However, D&K's argument relies on the
"mandate rule," which is merely one application of the multifaceted law of the case
doctrine. Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1038 n.2 ("Law of the case terminology has been
employed when addressing at least four distinct sets of problems. It has been used to
justify a trial court's refusal to reconsider matters in a continuing proceeding and an
appellate court's declining to reconsider matters resolved on a prior appeal. The
terminology has also been used to express the principle that inferior tribunals are bound
to honor the mandate of superior courts within a single judicial system. .. ."). Thus,
D&K is wrong in arguing that the requirements of the "mandate rule" applied to the trial
court on its Motion to Reconsider.
In fact, in the context of a motion for reconsideration, the law of the case doctrine
"is more flexible than the mandate rule." Id. at 1038. Indeed, on a motion to reconsider,

of Civil Procedure, and . . . has never been recognized as a proper motion in this state."
Wisden v. Bangerter, 893 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Utah 1995).
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the law of the case doctrine simply holds that "a court is justified in refusing to reconsider
matters it resolved in a prior ruling in the same case for reasons of efficiency and
consistency" and that courts should not reopen issues previously decided unless narrow
exceptional circumstances are present. Id. at 1039. Generally, the only "exceptional
circumstances" under which a trial court should reopen an issue that is has previously
decided are: (1) when there has been an intervening change of controlling authority; (2)
when new evidence becomes available; or (3) when the prior decision was "clearly
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Id. Absent these "exceptional
circumstances," a trial court has discretion in refusing to revisit an issue that it had
previously decided. Mower v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 329.
Here, the trial court, on remand from D&K I, decided that D&K forfeited the lease
as a matter of law. (Order, July 29, 2004; R. 1098-1103.) Therefore, the law of the case
doctrine applied and prevented the trial court from revisiting the issue on D&K's Motion
to Reconsider, absent "exceptional circumstances." The trial court did not find any
exceptional circumstances present. (See Order, Jan. 23, 2006, % 7; R. 1372 ("The defense
D&K wants to now argue is not new or novel, and indeed the main cases it relies upon in
its present motion were all issued before D&K opposed IHCHS's initial Motion for
Partial Judgment on the Pleadings."); \ 8 ("D&K cannot now, without cause, ask this
Court to consider newly developed arguments that it denied existed more than a year
ago.").) In sum, the trial court was well within its discretion in refusing to reconsider the
substantial compliance issue.
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Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the law of the case doctrine's
"mandate rule" applied rather than the more flexible standards applicable to a motion for
reconsideration, D&K's argument that the trial court erred under the "mandate rule" still
fails. Under the mandate rule, lower courts are bound to implement "both the letter and
the spirit of the [appellate court's] mandate, taking into account the appellate court's
opinion and the circumstances it embraces." Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1038 (emphasis
added). In other words, an appellate court need not rule on each and every particular
issue in a case in order for the appellate court's ruling to have preclusive effect. Id.
Here, although this Court did not specifically rule on the substantial compliance
defense in D&K I, this Court did decide the appropriate treatment of the forfeiture issue.
The "spirit" of this Court's ruling was that the trial court should grant summary judgment
in favor of IHC on the forfeiture issue if, after reconsideration of the totality of the
circumstances, it found that waiver did not occur as a matter of law. D&K I, 2003 UT 5,
^j 12. The spirit of the Court's decision was not, as D&K suggests, that the trial court
should afford D&K an opportunity to raise new defenses if it ultimately were to lose on
the waiver argument. In fact, this Court explicitly ruled out the opportunity for D&K to
raise a defense based on unconscionability: "Permitting IHC to enforce the forfeiture
provision of the written lease after D&K's failure to pay rent following a one-month
acquiescence in late payment is not unconscionable." Id. at ^ 1 1 . Thus, the trial court
was correct in applying the law of the case doctrine to preclude D&K from rearguing the
issue of forfeiture.
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D&K next argues that the trial court's May 31, 2001 summary judgment decision
was "reversed and no part of it was affirmed" by the Utah Supreme Court in D&K L
(Appellant's Br. 27.) Therefore, according to D&K, the trial court erred in denying its
Motion to Reconsider because the "vacated Memorandum Decision rendered May 31,
2001 cannot possibly serve as a basis for application of law of the case." (Id.) D&K's
argument is non sequitur for the simple reason that, in its Motion to Reconsider, D&K
moved the trial court to reconsider the July 29, 2004 Order, not the May 31, 2001 Order.
(Def.'s Mot. to Reconsider, Oct. 3, 2005; R. 1252-68.) Thus, the trial court denied
reconsideration of its July 29, 2004 Order in part on the basis of law of the case. The
July 29, 2004 Order has never been reviewed by an appellate court, let alone reversed or
vacated. See IHCHealth Servs., Inc. v. D&KMgmt., Inc., 2005 UT App 33 (dismissing
appeal of trial court's July 29, 2004 Order for lack of jurisdiction) (R. 1178-81.).14
In sum, the Court should affirm the trial court's decision to deny D&K's Motion
to Reconsider on the grounds that D&K was precluded from raising its substantial
compliance defense under the law of the case.

14

D&K further characterizes the trial court's initial summary judgment decision as
having been "reversed" in an effort to distinguish the present case from the Osguthorpe
case on which the trial court relied in denying D&K's Motion to Reconsider.
(Appellant's Br. 27.) In Osguthorpe, the appellate court "generally affirmed" the trial
court's analysis but remanded so that particular evidence could be considered by the trial
court. 2005 UT App 11. Similarly, in D&K I, this Court did not reverse the trial court's
decision but rather remanded for reconsideration in light of one corrected fact. 2003 UT
5 at ^f 9. In other words, this Court did "generally affirm" the trial court's treatment of
the forfeiture issue in D&KL Thus, D&K's argument that Osguthorpe lies "[i]n sharp
contrast [to] D&KF (Appellant's Br. 27), completely lacks merit.
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3-

D&K Was Not Entitled To Reconsideration Under the Standards of
Rule 54(b).

D&K is incorrect in arguing that "virtually every factor [under Rule 54(b)] would
have supported reconsideration of [the trial court's] July 29, 2004 Order." (Appellant's
Br. 29.) First, as discussed above, a trial court's decision to deny a motion to reconsider
"is within the discretion of the trial court" and should not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, % 57, 990 P.2d 945
(quoting Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996)). Further, D&K, as the party
bringing the motion to reconsider, bears the burden of justifying reversal of the trial
court's summary judgment decision. Id. at ^ 58. Although the factors discussed by D&K
(change in governing law, manifest injustice, inadequate briefing, and the need to correct
the court's own errors) have been recognized by Utah courts as grounds that might
warrant granting a motion to reconsider, Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306,
1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), none of these factors are present here.
i. Change In Governing Law Or Circumstances15
A trial court may reconsider its prior ruling if the applicable law subsequently
changes so as to render the court's ruling incorrect. See Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1311
(holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a motion to reconsider
where, after summary judgment was denied, the Utah Supreme Court issued two

15

Although D&K cites "different circumstances" as a justification for granting its
Motion to Reconsider (Appellant's Br. 30), D&K does not develop this argument or
suggest how it is different from the "change in governing law" analysis. Therefore, IHC
will address the "different circumstances" factor as part of the "change in governing law"
factor.
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decisions that altered the applicable legal framework). Here, D&K manipulates this rule
to suggest that, because this Court disagreed with its waiver analysis in D&K I, there was
a "substantial change in governing law" sufficient to warrant reconsideration.
(Appellant's Br. 30.) The Court should reject D&K's argument. The simple truth is that,
in D&K I, D&K misinterpreted Utah case law regarding the waiver analysis and lost its
estoppel argument. Now, having the benefit of this Court's ruling on the waiver and
estoppel issues, D&K wants a chance to start from scratch. Obviously, this is not a
legitimate basis for reconsideration of the trial court's summary judgment ruling.
In D&K I, this Court did not, as D&K states, engage in a "remarkable change of
course" with respect to the legal analysis of a waiver defense. (Appellant's Br. 30.) To
the contrary, this Court clearly stated that it was following the precedent established in
Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993). D&K
I, 2003 UT 5, Tf 8 ("Soter's essentially cleaned the slate of the type of categorical waiver
rule suggested by D&K . .. We decline to depart from our general waiver rule for
resolution of this case") (internal cites omitted). In light of this Court's express language
that it was following precedent, D&K's suggestion that this Court "rejected the settled
rule" is blatantly false. Likewise, D&K's argument that "the world abruptly changed
when D&K I was decided" (Appellant's Br. 31), is a gross exaggeration. Utah cases prior
to D&K I suggested the erosion of Woodland Theatres, the case which D&K fatally
relied upon. See, e.g., Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd., 889 P.2d at 461 (holding that
acceptance of a rent payment "is just one fact to consider in determining whether there
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was a waiver"). D&K's decision to also argue and bring an estoppel defense shows that
it was attempting to argue alternative theories to waiver in any instance.
In short, D&K attempts to stretch the meaning of "a substantial change in
governing law" beyond feasibility. Followed to its logical conclusion, D&K's argument
would give litigants a "second bite at the apple" every time an appellate court disagreed
with a litigant's interpretation of the law. Accordingly, the Court should reject D&K's
argument that there was a "substantial change in governing law" sufficient to warrant
reopening the trial court's summary judgment decision.
ii. Inadequate Briefing
D&K also raises the unusual argument that its total failure to brief substantial
compliance somehow justifies reconsideration of the trial court's summary judgment
decision. (Appellant's Br. 30.) D&K's argument is nonsensical. Because substantial
compliance is an affirmative defense, D&K bore the burden of raising and arguing this
defense to the trial court. See Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 UT 13, f 17
n.8, 974 P.2d 288 (holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving each element of
its affirmative defenses). One of the most rudimentary principles of modern civil
procedure is that a party cannot merely rely on its pleadings to defeat summary judgment,
and, when faced with such a motion, must demonstrate why its pleadings protect the party
from judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Simply put, D&K failed to meet this burden.
By contrast, in Trembly, the Utah Court of Appeals explained that a court can consider
whether "an issue was inadequately briefed when first considered by the court" in
deciding whether to reconsider a prior summary judgment ruling, 884 P.2d at 1311
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(emphasis added), suggesting that the issue must actually be raised. Because substantial
compliance was never raised here, this case does not present the type of situation that
should warrant reconsideration under the "inadequate briefing" factor.
D&K claims that its failure to brief substantial compliance should be excused
because it thought its waiver defense would be dispositive under its interpretation of the
case law. To be sure, D&K erroneously interpreted the case law on waiver. However,
this does not excuse D&K's failure to raise a substantial compliance argument. See Hart
v. Salt Lake County Comm 'n, 945 P.2d 125, 135 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a
party may not be excused from its failure to argue a defense "based on its erroneous
interpretation of. . . case law" and affirming the trial court's decision to deny the party's
motion to reconsider). And again, query why D&K briefed estoppel if it truly believed
waiver was dispositive.
Undoubtedly, the "inadequate briefing" factor under Trembly is not meant to
rescue litigants who fail to carry their burden of supporting their arguments with adequate
briefing. To the contrary, courts routinely refuse to consider arguments that are
unsupported by legal analysis or authority. E.g., Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, f 61,
130 P.3d 325. Here, Rule 54(b) should not be used as a means for rescuing D&K from
its failure to timely raise a substantial compliance argument.
iii. Manifest Injustice & Need to Correct Error
In arguing that the trial court should have granted its Motion to Reconsider on the
grounds of "manifest injustice," D&K essentially argues that enforcement of the
forfeiture provision of the Lease is unconscionable. D&K's argument is untenable at
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best, cf. Mower v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 329 (holding that enforcement of a liquidated
damages provision in a contract would not work a "manifest injustice" under "basic
principles of freedom of contract"), and has already been rejected by this Court, see D&K
I, 2003 UT 5, Tf 11 (enforcing the forfeiture provision of the Lease "is not
unconscionable").
As a general rule, an appellate court will not find "manifest injustice" to be present
unless the trial court committed plain error. Jensen 2005 UT 81, ^j 6 1 , . Accordingly, the
party moving for reconsideration on the grounds of manifest injustice must show three
elements: (1) the demonstration of error; (2) a qualitative showing that the error was
plain, manifest, or obvious to the trial court; and (3) evidence that the error affected the
substantial rights of a party. Id.
Here, the trial court hardly committed "plain error" in refusing to alter its summary
judgment ruling on the basis of D&K's substantial compliance defense when the facts
and the law demonstrate that D&K waived that defense. Cf. State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT
App 511, Tf 26, 153 P.3d 804 ("under the invited error doctrine a party on appeal cannot
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error."). Simply put, it was not plain error for the trial court to refuse to
revisit an argument that was waived.
4.

The Trial Court Did Not Err In Concluding That D&K Failed To
Present Evidence Of Substantial Compliance.

D&K also argues that it presented sufficient facts to support a finding of
substantial compliance, relying on the Utah Court of Appeals case, Beus v. Cache
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County, 1999 UT App 134. Even if this Court were to conclude that D&K did not waive
its substantial compliance argument and reach the question of whether D&K presented
sufficient facts to support such a defense, the Court should reject D&K's argument.
In fact, in D&K I, this Court already rejected D&K's proposed defense. There,
this Court expressly rejected D&K's argument that IHC should be "equitably estopped"
from terminating the Lease on the same argument that D&K now makes under its
"substantial compliance" theory. In its current brief, D&K claims that substantial
compliance is a defense to forfeiture because the adverse consequences that it will suffer
if the Lease is terminated are outweighed by the damages suffered by IHC due to D&K's
default. (Appellant's Br. 33-35.) In D&K I, D&K similarly argued that "equity and good
conscience should preclude IHC from forfeiting the Lease based on the late payment of
March rent," (Appellant's D&K I Br. 39, Oct. 31, 2001) and that "Utah law
acknowledges that a landlord may be precluded from strictly enforcing lease payment
deadlines by its continued acceptance of late rent," (id. at n.14 (citing Living Scriptures,
Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). In ruling on D&K's estoppel argument,
this Court explicitly stated, "Permitting IHC to enforce the forfeiture provision of the
written lease after D&K's failure to pay rent following a one-month acquiescence in late
payment is not unconscionable." 2003 UT 5 at ^f 11.
Moreover, numerous Utah cases have affirmed the right of a landlord to insist on
strict compliance with the requirement to pay rent in accordance with the terms of a lease
agreement, and have allowed forfeiture of a lease based on the simple failure of the tenant
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to pay rent. E.g., Living Scriptures, Inc., 890 P.2d at 10-11; Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at
461.
In sum, D&K's substantial compliance argument can fairly be construed as
nothing other than an impermissible attempt to seek a second chance to present a defense
that it could have, but did not, present to the trial court. See, e.g., Slattery v. Covey &
Co., Inc., 909 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("appellate review is not intended to
grant litigants a second chance to present their case . . . [T]his rule is not only reasonable,
but necessary, if litigation is ever to come to an end.") Accordingly, so that this litigation
might properly come to an end, this Court should hold that D&K waived its substantial
compliance defense and did not preserve it for appeal. In addition, the Court should
affirm the trial court's decision to refuse to revisit its grant of summary judgment in favor
of IHC on the forfeiture issue. The trial court was under no obligation to consider an
affirmative defense that D&K waived. Finally, even if the Court reaches the merits of
D&K's substantial compliance argument, the Court should reject it outright because it
directly contradicts this Court's ruling in D&K I.
D&K invites this Court to issue an opinion which will be cited by litigants for
years to come as the case standing for the proposition that a defense is not waived even it
is brought up for the first time after judgment has been issued. For the numerous reasons
set forth above, the Court should decline to do so.
3.

The Trial Court Properly Granted IHC Its Attorneys' Fees Because the
Present Action was Brought "Under the Lease."
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In appealing the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to IHC, D&K argues that
there was no legal basis for the trial court to award attorneys' fees to IHC because IHC
terminated the Lease with D&K effective as of its 1998 Termination Notice , thereby
eliminating the Lease provision through which IHC could recover its attorneys' fees.
(Appellant's Br. at 35-38.) D&K's argument is flawed.
At the hearing on IHC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, the trial court found that the
Lease entitled the prevailing party to any action brought during the "term" of the Lease to
recover its attorneys' fees. The trial court then found that IHC's termination of the Lease
was effective on April 15, 1998 when it sent the Termination Notice to D&K. (R. 1374.)
Based on that language, the trial court speculated whether IHC brought this action after
the "term of lease ended." (Id.) It invited further briefing from the parties. (Id.) After
additional briefing by the parties, the trial court determined that this action was brought
"during the term of the lease" because, until Judge Livingston ruled that IHC was entitled
to terminate the Lease, the Lease was still in effect.16 (R. 1385-86.)

16

D&K complains that the trial court issued "inconsistent rulings" during the
process. (Appellant's Br. at 38-41.) Ironically, D&K argues that the trial court's change
of position violated the law of the case doctrine. (Id. at 40.) This argument is
inconsistent with its argument earlier in its brief that the trial court was free to revisit a
prior ruling with respect to substantial compliance without violating the law of the case
doctrine. (Id. at 29.) Moreover, the procedural history illustrates the thoughtfulness of
the trial court in this matter. The trial court speculated whether declaring the tenancy
forfeited as of the date of Termination Notice may invalidate the claim for attorneys'
fees. (R. 1374.) It asked for supplemental briefing on this point. (Id.) After receiving
the supplemental briefing and again convening oral argument, the trial court concluded
that its initial impression was incorrect and IHC was entitled to attorneys' fees. (R. 138586.) This history shows careful deliberation rather than reversible error and is precisely
the type of situation where reconsideration is warranted, in contrast to D&K's substantial
compliance argument.
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The trial court was correct in ruling that IHC is entitled to attorneys' fees under
the Lease. The Lease specifically provides the landlord with the right to any fees
necessary to enforce the Lease. (R. 20.) It is undisputed that D&K breached the Lease
by failing to pay March 1998 rent. (Appellant's Br. at 5; Fact 9; R. 120.) It is also
undisputed that D&K's breach triggered IHC's right to terminate the Lease. (See Fact 7.)
In turn, this triggered D&K's obligation to leave the premises. (Id. "In the event of such
termination, Tenant agrees to immediately surrender possession of the Demised
Premises.") D&K refused to honor IHC's Termination Notice, requiring IHC to bring
this action. Therefore, this action is an action to enforce D&K's obligation under the
Lease to vacate the premises. IHC prevailed in this action to enforce its forfeiture
remedy under the Lease. (Order, July 29, 2004; R. 1100-01.) Accordingly, IHC is
entitled to attorneys' fees under the Lease.
The trial court further concluded, correctly, that there could be no other reasonable
interpretation. Indeed, to hold otherwise would prevent a landlord from simultaneously
exercising its rights to terminate a lease and enforce an attorneys' fees provision.
Normally, following the expiration of a lease term, a landlord could bring an action for
trespass and unlawful detainer and, by statute, gain attorneys' fees for the tenant's refusal
to depart the premises. However, in this matter, the trial court stayed execution of the
judgment, which precluded IHC from taking advantage of that statute. (R. 685-89.) In
other respects, the stay required IHC to act as an ongoing landlord. For example, IHC
continues to be required to provide utilities to the building so that D&K may remain in
business. The stay also requires IHC to provide parking for D&K's customers. It would

SaltLake-310675.4 0033566-00014

45

be wholly unfair and inequitable for D&K to insist that, during this forced tenancy, IHC
has all of the obligations, but none of the benefits, of a landlord as set forth in the Lease.
Under D&K's interpretation of the attorneys' fee provisions, D&K would have the ability
to demand performance from IHC in every aspect of the Lease, such as providing
parking, utilities, and the like, but IHC is not entitled to the benefit of the Lease's
attorneys' fee provision. Simply stated, D&K cannot have it both ways.
4.

The Amount of Attorneys' Fees Was Just and Reasonable.
D&K next argues that the amount of attorneys' fees awarded by the trial court to

IHC was improper. (Appellant's Br. at 40-48.) D&K argues both that IHC did not
provide enough detail to justify the award {id. at 42), and that IHC provided too much
information and did not adequately segregate time entries by subject matter to make it
more easily objected to by D&K {id. at 47).
Determining the reasonableness of an award of attorneys' fees lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, \ 20, 40 P.3d
1119. Accordingly, the trial court's award should be affirmed unless D&K can show that
it was clearly erroneous. Id. atfflf19-20. As a general rule, a trial court does not commit
clear error if it awards a fee based on consideration of four factors: (1) what legal work
was actually performed; (2) how much of the work performed was reasonably necessary
to adequately prosecute the matter; (3) whether the attorney's billing rate is consistent
with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services; and (4) whether
circumstances require consideration of additional factors. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken,
764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988).

SaltLake-310675 A 0033566-00014

46

Here, the entirety of Volume 6 of the trial court record is devoted to the sole issue
of attorneys' fees. Approximately 300 pages in the record are devoted to briefing,
affidavits, interim rulings by the trial court, and other papers devoted exclusively to the
topic of propriety, reasonableness, and amount of attorneys' fees and costs. (R. 13851663.) For eleven full months, the parties addressed no issue other than attorneys' fees
before the trial court. To now argue that IHC did not provide enough information or
marshal sufficient evidence to support the attorneys' fees it expended is, to say the least,
a stretch.
An important point completely glossed over by D&K is its complete failure,
despite repeated promises to the trial court, to raise any specific or concrete objection to
the fees sought. IHC first moved for an award of attorneys' fees on August 25, 2005. (R.
1200-07.) After months of briefing and argument on whether any fees would be awarded
at all, IHC filed its Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Verified Memorandum of Costs on
July 10, 2006.17 (R. 1388-1477.) D&K sought and obtained an extension of time from
IHC to respond to IHC's Affidavit. (R. 1481, ^J 3.) Nearly one month later, on August 8,
2006, D&K filed a motion for an additional extension of time to allow it even more time
to respond to the voluminous papers filed, demonstrating the history of attorneys' fees
accumulated by IHC. (R. 1480-83.) On August 21, 2006, a full month and a half after
IHC filed its Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, D&K finally filed a response. (R.

The trial court indicated and IHC agreed that until the trial court actually
awarded attorneys' fees it would be premature for IHC to file an affidavit of specific
attorneys' fees and costs.
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1485-96.) However, that response was nearly devoid of any concrete objections. The
trial court made a specific finding in a minute entry dated August 30, 2006 that:
[D&K's] response, as Plaintiff points out, is an attack on Plaintiffs failure
to allocate fees incurred on matters on which Plaintiff prevailed. While
allocation is the test of the party claiming fees, I agree with Plaintiff that
the argument in the context of this case is disingenuous. Defendant spent
weeks preparing a response, but it's submission made little effort to identify
issues and/or fees for which Plaintiff should not be compensated, and none
of the criticisms that were included make reference to Plaintiffs detailed
billing records. (R. 1503) (Emphasis added.)
The trial court found IHC's submission detailed. (Id.) In that same ruling, though, the
trial court noted that in order to comply with the analytical framework in Bracken, it
would require IHC to resubmit a revised affidavit of fees, removing some of the fees
sought on matters on which it found IHC had not prevailed (e.g., supplemental pleading
on lease term, etc.). (R. 1504.)
Thereafter, on September 12, 2006, IHC filed its second Affidavit of Attorneys
Fees and Memorandum of Costs. (R. 1506-99.) D&K filed a response to the second
affidavit a mere eight days later, again without providing any concrete objections to
specific time entries or categories of times billed, other than several which were already
stipulated or ruled upon by the trial court. (R. 1600-07.) Following briefing by the
parties, the trial court issued another written order. (R. 1614-15.) In that order, the trial
court expressly articulated that it was following the analytical framework laid out in
Bracken and Rule 1.5 of the Utah Code of Professional Responsibility. (R. 1614.) The
trial court then made several factual findings. First, it dealt with the average hourly rate
over the numerous years this case has been litigated. (Id.) The trial court made an
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express finding that the resulting average rate of $191.35 per hour charged by IHC's
counsel was lower than current market rates and was "clearly reasonable." (Id.) The trial
court then made the express finding that even though this is an eviction matter, "it is a
commercial eviction, with a great deal at stake, and the litigation has been both complex
and very aggressively contested." (R. 1615.) Significantly, the trial court noted, "in the
absence of specific challenges to tasks and/or time spent, I do not find that there is any
substantial basis to challenge the total fee in light of the result." (Id.) Simply put, IHC
briefed why its fees were incurred and why they were reasonable; D&K failed to rebut
those arguments.
Additionally, the trial court made numerous discounts to the attorneys' fees IHC
sought. The actual value of services that IHC received up to the point of the first
Affidavit, based on counsels' standard rates, was $427,518.00. (R. 1392.) A discount of
$91,205.96 was applied to those fees because IHC's counsel provided that discount to
IHC, which the court properly passed on to D&K. (Id.) IHC then sought attorneys' fees
through May 2006 of $336,312.04. (R. 1393.) After an additional four months'worth of
briefing and argument (which generated additional attorneys' fees), the trial court
ultimately awarded a total of only $303,514.59 to IHC. (R. 1615.) That is, the trial court
had disallowed approximately $40,000.00 worth of fees sought by IHC based upon the
findings of the court that the fees sought were not expressly related to matters on which
IHC prevailed.
This procedural history is in stark contrast to the story painted by D&K in its brief.
The trial court did explicitly apply the legal standard set forth in Bracken for awarding
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attorneys' fees. (R. 1614.) The trial court spent months asking for resubmissions of
affidavits of fees and costs and gave D&K two separate opportunities to file objections to
those affidavits. The trial court carefully evaluated all of the evidence in determining a
reasonable award. There is no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.
D&K, unhappy with the fact that it failed to articulate any reason why the fees sought by
IHC were not reasonable, cannot show that the trial court committed patent error. See
Bracken, 764 P.2d at 989 (holding that an appellate court should not disturb a trial court's
findings and judgment regarding a reasonable award of attorneys' fees absent "patent
error or clear abuse of discretion").
VII.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IHC asks this Court to uphold the trial court's ruling
granting IHC summary judgment on the issue of forfeiture and to affirm the trial court's
award of attorneys' fees to IHC.
DATED this fw day of May, 2007.
STOEL RIVES LLP

JD. Matthew Moscdh
Lauren A. Shurman
Attorneys for Appellee
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I hereby certify on May /y , 2007, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
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Michael N. Zundel, Esq.
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175 East 400 South, Suite 900
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1775 East Ellen Way
FILED
Sandy, Utah 84092
UTAH APPELLATE COURT^
801-523-1186
SEP 16 z:%

i

JAO

have come across the bench, that it is — I mean it's very clear
that until you have a final order - put it this way.
final orders are executable.

Only

Also, necessarily, only final

orders, unless some exception of the rules apply, only final
orders are appealable.

So they would not be entitled to

immediate possession of the property unless this Court rules
that the order which grants forfeiture is a final order.

So

with that premise —
THE COURT:

So you'll bow to that, is that you

believe there's common facts underlying the breach-of-contract
damage claim?
MR. BRONSON:

Yes, your Honor.

And then with that

premise then we necessarily go to Rule 54 (b), which is one of
the exceptions to a standard historical final-order rule, and
whether or not this is an issue, this is an order that can be
certifiable under 54 (b) as a final order, even though all
claims in the case are not resolved.
is the Kennecott

And the test under 54(b)

case, and the first prong of the

Kennecott

case for finality is whether or not there are overlapping
facts.
THE COURT:

There are no facts left unless you

identify some for me, and that's one of my questions for you.
MR. BRONSON:
THE COURT:
are there?

Okay.

No facts left that determine possession,

Only the damages that result from forfeiture of

1 I staying in possession,
2 !

MR. BRONSON:

I would agree with your Honor that,

3 i given the Court's ruling, there are no facts left — no facts
4 | left that have to be decided.

There were no facts initially

i

5 | with this motion for summary judgment.
6

THE COURT:

7 |

MR. BRONSON:

8

Uh-huh (affirmative).
But given this ruling, there are no

facts that have to be decided for possession.

However, there

9 t are a number of facts, and there are certainly issues that
10 ' remain, with regard to their damages.
11 '

THE COURT:

Oh, I agree with that.

I think we're

12

differing on that, but while there might have been facts in

13

common at one point with — unless some of the remaining facts

14 , can go to the issue of possession, why isn't it a final — why
15

cannot it not be a final judgment on that issue?

16

MR. BRONSON:

17

Because Kennecott

and its progeny are

very clear that the Supreme Court of Utah has decided, for
i
i

18 i purposes of Utah law, to adopt the Seventh Circuit approach to
19 I finality and to certifications for 54(b) orders. And that
i
i

20

analysis is that if the underlying facts are the same - not if
!

21

the causes of action are different, not if the remedies are

22

different - but if the underlying facts — and here the
I

23 I underlying fact is IHC wants possession of its property and
24 i wants damages for breach because we remain in possession.
25 ' That's the underlying -
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CONSENT, RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
AND
ESCROW DEPOSIT AGREEMENT
This Consent, Reservation of Rights and Escrow Deposit Agreement (the "Escrow
Agreement") is made and entered into as of the 1st day of March, 1999, by IHC HEALTH
SERVICES, INC., a Utah nonprofit corporation (afflCHS") and D&K MANAGEMENT,
INC., a Utah corporation ("D&K Management") in connection with that certain Lease
Agreement dated July 18, 1994 (the aLease Agreement"), by and between IHCHS, as
successor in interest to Medical Plaza 9400, as landlord, and D&K Management, as tenant.
Covenants and Understandings
1.
On or about April 14, 1998, IHCHS, by certified mail and hand-delivery,
caused a Notice of Default and Forfeiture to be sent to D&K Management, the contents of
which instructed D&K Management that its leasehold tenancy in the real property located on
or about 5142 South State Street, Murray, Utah (the "Leased Premises") was forfeited due to
D&K Management's failure to comply with the terms of the Lease Agreement (the "Default
Letter"). According to the Default Letter, D&K Management was to vacate the Leased
Premises on or before May 15, 1998.
2.
D&K Management disputes any claim by IHCHS that the Lease Agreement
has been forfeited. D&K Management also claims, and IHCHS disputes any claims, that
IHCHS has waived its remedy of forfeiture under the Lease Agreement. D&K Management
further maintains, and IHCHS disputes, that D&K Management has been and continues to be
entitled to occupy the Leased Premises pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Lease
Agreement.
3.
Pending resolution of the above disputes, the parties desire to establish and
maintain an escrow account with ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, Salt Lake City, Utah
(the "Escrow Agent"), into which D&K Management will make monthly deposits of any and
all amounts due and payable pursuant to and in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the Lease Agreement (individually, an "Escrow Deposit" and, collectively, the "Escrow
Deposits").
4.
The parties agree that, by the execution and delivery of this Escrow
Agreement, IHCHS does not waive its claims of default and/or forfeiture of the Lease
Agreement against D&K Management by allowing D&K Management to continue to occupy
the Leased Premises or to make any one or all of the Escrow Deposits, and all of IHCHS'
claims and assertions against D&K Management, including without limitation those set forth
in the Default Letter, and against any defenses of D&K Management, whether articulated
SLCl-44337.5 335664)013
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before or after the date of this Escrow Agreement, are expressly reserved and not waived by
reason of this Escrow Agreement and shall not in any way be lessened or diminished by
reason of or in connection with the execution and delivery of this Escrow Agreement.
5.
The parties agree that, by the execution and delivery of this Escrow
Agreement, D&K Management does not admit IHCHS is entitled to the remedy of forfeiture
based upon a breach of any term or condition of the Lease Agreement, and all of D&K
Management's defenses against the claims and assertions of IHCHS, whether articulated
before or after the date of this Escrow Agreement, are expressly reserved and not waived by
reason of this Escrow Agreement or otherwise and shall not in any way be lessened or
diminished by reason of or in connection with the execution and delivery of this Escrow
Agreement.
6.
The parties agree that making an Escrow Deposit in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the Lease Agreement shall constitute a tender of rent due and payable
under the Lease Agreement by D&K Management to IHCHS; provided that the parties
further agree that any failure of D&K Management to timely make an Escrow Deposit in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the Lease Agreement shall constitute a breach of
the terms and conditions of the Lease Agreement; provided further that the parties agree that
all grace periods allowed by the Lease Agreement shall continue in force and not be waived
by the execution and delivery hereof.
7.
Within five (5) business days of the full and complete execution of this Escrow
Agreement, IHCHS shall return to D&K Management all checks tendered by D&K
Management as monthly lease payments under the Lease Agreement and, pending resolution
of the above disputes, held by IHCHS, which checks, together with the two (2) checks
tendered to IHCHS by D&K Management for March 1998 and May 1998 and returned to
D&K Management1, total FORTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX AND
60/100 DOLLARS ($40,186.60). The checks (with the corresponding dates of tender) are
summarized as follows:
Month
March 1998
May 1998
June 1998

Date Tendered
April 17, 1998/April 23, 1998
May 1, 1998
May 29, 1998

Check Amount
3,608.00
3,280.00
3,280.00

1

D&K Management tendered to IHCHS a check in the amount of $3,608, inclusive
of a $328 late fee, on April 16, 1998 and, again, on April 23, 1998, for the lease payment
due under the Lease Agreement for March 1998, and a check in the amount of $3,280 on
May 1, 1998 for the lease payment due under the Lease Agreement for May 1998. The
check for $3,608 was returned to D&K Management on April 17, 1998 and, again, on May
11, 1998, and the check for $3,280 was returned to D&K Management on May 11, 1998.
SLC1-44337.5 335664)013
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July 1998
July 1998 (adj.)
August 1998
September 1998
October 1998
November 1998
December 1998
January 1999
February 1999
March, 1999

July 1, 1998
July 9, 1998
July 31, 1998
September 2, 1998
October 1, 1998
October 30, 1998
November 30, 1998
December 29, 1998
January 29, 1999
February 26, 1999
TOTAL:

3,280.00
55.40
3,335.40
3,335.40
3,335.40
3,335.40
3,335.40
3,335.40
3,335.40
3.335.40
$40,186.60

Within ten (10) business days thereafter, D&K Management shall deposit with the
Escrow Agent an amount equal to the sum of the checks tendered to IHCHS (collectively, the
"Initial Escrow Deposits"), as specified above, secure an "Acknowledgment and
Acceptance" thereof from the Escrow Agreement (as a part of this Escrow Agreement) and
deliver a signed copy of such "Acknowledgment and Acceptance" to IHCHS. Further, from
and after the date hereof, any and all other amounts due and payable pursuant to and in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the Lease Agreement shall, pending resolution
of the above disputes, be deposited with the Escrow Agent and shall constitute and be
deemed part of the Escrow Deposits. Concurrently with the making of any Escrow Deposit
(including the Initial Escrow Deposits), D&K Management shall provide written notice to
IHCHS's counsel of the amount and date of deposit thereof.
8.
The Escrow Agent shall take and hold all Escrow Deposits in an interestbearing account. Interest shall accrue and inure to the benefit of IHCHS. Escrow Agent may
invest the Escrow Deposits during the time it is held hereunder in certificates of deposit
issued by federally-insured banks, U.S. government securities and in such other investments
as may be approved by IHCHS from time to time in writing, and all interest earned on the
Escrow Deposits shall become part of the Escrow Deposits and shall be disbursed by the
Escrow Agent as part of the Escrow Deposits in accordance with the terms hereof.
9.
The Escrow Agent shall be reimbursed by IHCHS for any expenses, attorneys*
fees, court costs, taxes, or disbursements reasonably incurred by the Escrow Agent in the
administration of this Escrow Agreement, which the Escrow Agent, by the execution hereof,
confirms and agrees shall not exceed, in the aggregate during any twelve (12) month period,
TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY NO/100 DOLLARS ($250). The Escrow Agent shall not be
liable for any action taken or suffered by Escrow Agent in good faith in accordance with the
advice of its legal counsel.
10.
It is intended by the parties hereto that Escrow Agent's duty shall be solely
administrative, and regardless of whether or not it has knowledge of any other agreements by
the parties, the Escrow Agent shall not be bound by any such agreements or the knowledge
SLC1-44337.5
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thereof, but must hold and dispose of the Escrow Deposits solely in accordance with the
terms of this Escrow Agreement.
11.
The Escrow Agent may resign at any time by notifying the parties and such
resignation shall become effective on the date of mailing and Escrow Agent shall thereupon
be relieved of all other responsibilities in relation to this Escrow Agreement, except the
responsibility to hold the Escrow Deposits until a successor escrow agent is appointed by the
parties and accepts the appointment or the Escrow Deposits are taken by reason of law or
action of duly constituted authority, either state or federal.
12.
If at any time Escrow Agent deems itself insecure as to proper methods for
discharging its duties hereunder, then it is completely discharged of any liability whatsoever
in this matter if it files an action in a court of competent jurisdiction and tenders or
surrenders the Escrow Deposits.
13.
The Escrow Agent shall not disburse any part or all of the Escrow Deposits
until the Escrow Agent receives written authorization from both parties hereto or until the
Escrow Agent is ordered to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Escrow Agent,
in connection with any amounts to be disbursed pursuant to this Escrow Agreement, shall
request instructions for payment from the party entitled thereto or, if no such instructions are
promptly given, shall make payment to the address of the payee as indicated below or such
other address as may have been provided by and for any such party.
(a)

If to IHCHS, to:
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC.
36 South State Street
21st Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attention: Mr. Everett N. Goodwin, Jr.
Senior Vice President
with a copy to:
Guy P. Kroesche, Esq.
STOEL RIVES LLP
201 South Main Street
Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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(b)

If to D&K Management, to
D&K Management, Inc.
4255 South 300 West, Suite 6
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Attention: Mr. Kent Bangerter
President
with a copy to:
Michael N. Zundel, Esq.
JARDINE LINEBAUGH & DUNN
370 East South Temple
Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

14.
All demands and notices to be given hereunder shall be in writing and shall be
sent either by the parties or by their respective attorneys who are authorized to do so on their
behalf, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, by
confirmed facsimile or by hand-delivery, in any case addressed to the party to be notified at
its address set forth in this Escrow Agreement or to such other address as such party shall
have specified most recently by like notice. Notices given as provided above shall be
deemed given three (3) days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays) after the date
so mailed, on the date confirmed facsimile shall be delivered, or the date delivered if handdelivered.
15.
This Escrow Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the
State of Utah.
16.
This Escrow Agreement shall inure to the benefit of the successors and assigns
of the parties hereto.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Escrow Agreement is executed and entered into as of
the date first set forth above.
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC.,
a Utah nonprofit corporation

r. Senior yiee President
Dated this

day of

L. . 1999.

D & K MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah
corporation

By.
Kent Bangerter^Tresident
Dated this [S

SLCI-44337.2 335664013
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IN T H E T H I R D J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T , SALT L A K E CITY

2

S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y , S T A T E OF U T A H

3

-oOo-

4

IHC H E A L T H S E R V I C E S ,

7

Case No.

Plaintiff,

5
6

INC.,
990905693

HEARING

vs.
D & K MANAGEMENT,

INC.,

(Videotape

Proceedings)

Defendant.

8

-oOo-

9
10

BE IT R E M E M B E R E D that on t h e 2nd day of M a r c h ,

11
12
13
14
15
16

2004, commencing

at the h o u r of 8:01

R O B E R T K. H I L D E R , s i t t i n g as J u d g e in the

following videotape proceedings were

the

had.

-oOoA P P E A R A N C E S
For t h e

M A T T H E W M . DURHAM
D. MATTHEW MOSCON
A t t o r n e y s at L a w
Stoel R i v e s , L L P
201 S o u t h M a i n , #1100
Salt L a k e City, U t a h

Plaintiff:

20
21

23

HONORABLE

above-named

C o u r t for t h e p u r p o s e of t h i s c a u s e , and that

18

22

the a b o v e -

e n t i t l e d m a t t e r c a m e on for h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e

17

19

a.m.,

For t h e

84111

MICHAEL N. ZUNDEL
Attorney at Law
Princes, Yeates & Geldzahler
175 East 400 South, #900
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

Defendant:
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Third Judicial District

24

MAR 1 5 20M
25
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ALAN P. SMITH, CSR
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1

in contracts.

2

The Supreme Court in 1983 said, you affirm a portion

3

of a contract, you affirm the whole.

4

the way back to 1936, also.

5
6

THE COURT:

So—

Now, did you argue that to the Supreme

Court?

7

MR. ZUNDEL:

8

THE COURT:

9

Now, that's—goes all

Yes, we did.
Then they didn't really say that, did

they, when they discussed waiver?

Justice Wilkins, I mean,

10

that's—wouldn't that make sense, that if that was persuasive

11

to the Supreme Court, they would have come back and said,

12

under these facts, one way of raising waiver is you affirm the

13

part, you affirm the whole?

14
15

I mean, it's a great phrase, I like it.

But why

didn't they pick it up?

16

MR. ZUNDEL:

I—I think they too—I think they took

17

the—the—they—they took the largest peg sticking out of the

18

wall to hang the decision on, which was: You didn't even get

19

the facts right, Judge.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. ZUNDEL:

Uh huh.
So, I'm sending it back to you, it is

22

premature, at best, at best, it's premature.

23

wrong.

At worst, it's

24

THE COURT:

I guess we're reading it differently.

25

I hear your argument, Mr. Zundel, but I—I am not

9

sure that truly, except for at the beginning, you addressed my
specific question, you've addressed whether a waiver's
occurred and you made it well, I appreciate it; but if this
Court was to determine under the undisputed facts that are now
in the record, that a waiver has not occurred, is there some
reason under the law of summary judgment, this Court could not
do that?
MR. ZUNDEL:

Absolutely.

Because there are facts in

the record which look—which addressed in the light most
favorable to this client of ours—of mine, D & K, show a
distinct, unequivocal act of waiver, inconsistent with any
other result, any other intent.
You know, this idea of corporate intent, let's—
THE COURT:
MR. ZUNDEL:

Uh huh.
I see that—I see that IHC grabs onto

this, but it doesn't want to acknowledge that, as a
corporation, it's bound by the acts of its agent.

You know,

it—it talks about in its memoranda on its motion, this
motion—
THE COURT:
MR. ZUNDEL:

Uh huh.
— i t says, you know, we accepted the

April rent, that should not be held against us because it was
delivered to our home office, and—
THE COURT: Well,—
MR. ZUNDEL:

—and w e —

10

